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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying
petitioner's (Ms. Seals') request for an award of the
attorney fees which she was forced to incur in connection
with respondent's (Mr. Condie's) bankruptcy proceedings for
the purpose of enforcing an hold harmless provision of the
Decree of Divorce.

A trial court's decision regarding a

request for attorney fees in divorce proceedings is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.
(Utah App. 1988).

Rasband

v.

Rasband,

752 P.2d 1331

This issue was preserved in Ms. Seals'

Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and for a
Finding of Contempt.

(R. 258)

2. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion of
law that Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings were the
appropriate time and place for Ms. Seals to have asked for
an award of the attorney fees which she incurred in order to
protect her rights under the Decree of Divorce.

A trial

court's conclusions of law are reviewable for correctness.

1

Ron Case

Roofing

& Asphalt

Paving,

P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

Inc.

v.

Blomquist,

773

This issue was preserved in

Ms. Seals' Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and
for a Finding of Contempt.

(R. 258)

3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that
the adversary proceeding which Ms. Seals filed in Mr.
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings to determine the
dischargeability of Mr. Condie's obligations under the
Decree of Divorce was wholly unnecessary initially because
Ms. Seals was not a named creditor in the bankruptcy
proceedings.

A trial court's conclusions of law are
Ron Case Roofing

reviewable for correctness.
Paving,

Inc.

v.

Blomquist,

&

Asphalt

773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

This issue was preserved in Ms. Seals' Motion for Judgment
of Support Arrears Etc. and for a Finding of Contempt.
(R. 258)
4. Whether the trial court erred in its
conclusion/finding that the parties' Hopkinsville Federal
Savings Bank (HFSB) obligation was satisfied in April 2001.
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable for
correctness.
Blomquist,

Ron Case

Roofing

& Asphalt

Paving,

773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

2

Inc.

v.

This issue was

preserved in Ms, Seals' Motion for Judgment of Support
Arrears Etc. and for a Finding of Contempt.

(R. 258)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2)
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)
11 U.S.C. § 727
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third

Judicial District Court of Tooele County denying Ms. Seals'
request for an award of the attorney fees which she incurred
in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings for the purpose of
preventing Mr. Condie from discharging his obligations under
the hold harmless provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
II.

Statement of Facts
L

A Decree of Divorce was entered in this action on

November 22, 1999.
2.

(R. 145)

Paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce orders Mr.

Condie to "assume complete responsibility for all loans,
debts and obligations, whether incurred by [Mr. Condie] or
incurred jointly as husband and wife, with the exception of
the loan on the 1995 Eagle Vision automobile, which [Ms.

3

Seals] shall assume/'
3.

(R. 139)

One of the obligations which Mr, Condie was ordered

to assume was a promissory note which the parties executed
in favor of the Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank in April
of 1997.

The promissory note was secured by a parcel of

real property which Ms. Seals owned in Tooele County, Utah.
(R. 272)
4.

Unfortunately, Mr. Condie failed to make the

payments called for under the promissory note and in August
of 2000 Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank filed an action
against the parties in the state of Kentucky to collect the
amount due and owing.
5.

(R. 272)

Shortly thereafter on December 29, 2000, Mr. Condie

filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah.
6.

(R. 348)

Mr. Condie failed to list Ms. Seals as a creditor

on his initial bankruptcy schedules.

However, by letter

dated January 24, 2001, Mr. Condie gave Ms. Seals the
following notice of his bankruptcy proceedings:
"... you are hereby given notice of [my bankruptcy
proceedings] and informed that the debt due you will be
discharged the same as if your debt had been duly
listed and scheduled, under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the
4

Bankruptcy Code. In particular, if you believe the
debt owing to Hopkinsville Federal Bank should be
declared nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph 14 of
the Decree of Divorce ... then I would advise you to
file a claim with the abovementioned bankruptcy court.
If you do not file a claim with the bankruptcy court to
determine whether the debt to Hopkinsville Federal
Savings Bank is nondischargeable ... then the debt may
be discharged under section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and a discharge operates as an injunction against
any act to collect a discharged debt."
(R. 551-552)
7.

Accordingly, Ms. Seals was required to retain an

attorney experienced in bankruptcy matters to file an
adversary proceeding in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy case
objecting to Mr. Condie's attempt to discharge his
obligation under the Decree of Divorce to hold Ms. Seals
harmless from the HFSB obligation.

Ms. Seals was required

to pay the bankruptcy attorney $6,715.75 (R. 271) in order
to obtain a Partial Summary Judgment in which the bankruptcy
court ruled that Mr. Condie's obligation to hold Ms. Seals
harmless from the HFSB note and mortgage was
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).
8.

(R. 263)

On or about March 30, 2001, HFSB assigned the note

and the mortgage on the Tooele County property to a limited
liability company managed by Mr. Condie's friend and former
employer, Brian W. Steffensen.

5

(R. 648)

9.

In or around April 2004, Mr. Condie paid the

remaining balance of the HFSB Note and Mr. Steffensen
executed a Release of Note and Mortgage on April 26, 2004,
thereby clearing title to the Tooele County property.
(R. 647)
10.

On or about August 11, 2004, Ms. Seals filed a

Motion for Judgment of Support Arrears Etc. and for a
Finding of Contempt.

In her motion Ms. Seals requested,

inter alia, that the trial court enter a judgment in her
favor and against Mr. Condie for the amount of attorney fees
which she was forced to incur in connection with Mr.
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings in order to prevent Mr.
Condie's obligation to hold Ms. Seals harmless from the HFSB
Note from being discharged under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c)(1) &
727.

(R. 258)
11.

Following an evidentiary hearing held December 8

and 9, 2004, the trial court issued its Order on
Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a Finding of
Contempt in which it denied Ms. Seals' request for a
judgment for the attorney fees which she incurred in

6

connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings.
(R. 426)

The trial court explained its denial as follows:

The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling on Seals' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment did not award attorney's fees,
nor did the parties in their subsequent Stipulation and
Settlement provide for the recoupment of attorney's
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an
adversarial proceeding against Condie. Those
proceedings were the appropriate time and place for the
parties to ask for attorney's fees and this Court will
not grant such fees on that basis. Furthermore, the
evidence suggests that the adversarial proceeding was
wholly unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named
creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings... Finally, this
Court notes that the Hopkinsville obligation was
satisfied in April 2001, thus making any subsequent
proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary...
(R. 425-424)
12.

Ms. Seals filed her motion to alter or amend the

Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a Finding
of Contempt on or about February 11, 2005.
13.

(R. 419)

The trial court issued its Ruling and Order

denying Ms. Seals' motion to alter or amend on March 14,
2005.

(R. 495)

14.

On April 27, 2005, the trial court entered its

final Order and Judgment denying Ms. Seals' request for a
judgment for the amount of attorney fees which she incurred
in connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings.
(R. 510-509)

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Ms.
Seals' request for an award of the attorney fees which she
was forced to incur in connection with Mr. Condie's
bankruptcy proceedings because its decision was based upon
an erroneous conclusion of law.

The trial court concluded

that Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings were the
appropriate time and place for Ms. Seals to have asked for
an award of attorney fees.

Bankruptcy courts, however,

follow the "American Rule" under which attorney fees are
ordinarily not recoverable in cases brought upon or
involving bankruptcy law absent specific statutory authority
or a contractual right.

E.g.,

Dennison

v. Hammond

Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 769 (Bankr. D.Ut. 1998).

(In

re

Ms. Seals did

not have a contractual right to attorney fees in Mr.
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings and there is no statute
authorizing an award of attorney fees in connection with
litigation prosecuted under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

Id.

The trial court also erred in its conclusion that Ms.
Seals' § 523(a)(15) adversary proceeding was wholly
unnecessary because Ms. Seals was not a named creditor in
Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings.

8

A bankruptcy discharge

is a matter of law.

See

11 U.S.C. § 727.

Because Ms. Seals

had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings,
any debt which Mr. Condie owed to her would have been
discharged whether or not it was listed on Mr. Condie's
bankruptcy schedules unless Ms. Seals had timely filed her
complaint objecting to dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a) (15).

See,

1989) ; and Cohen

e.g.,
& Miller,

871 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.

In re Price,
Consumer

Bankruptcy

Manual

§

4:231 at page 4-450 ("when the creditor has notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time ... for timely requesting a
dischargeability determination, the debtor's omissions
[i.e., failing to list the creditor on the debtor's
schedules] cannot be used by the creditor to except its debt
from discharge").
Finally, the trial court erred in concluding that the
parties' Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank obligation was
satisfied in April 2001.

All that happened in April of 2001

was that a Utah limited liability company managed by Mr.
Condies' friend and former employer, Brian W. Steffensen,
purchased the HFSB note and mortgage.

However, the note and

mortgage were clearly not satisfied at that time and it was
not until April of 2004 that Mr. Condie finally paid the

9

note off and Mr. Steffensen executed a Release of [the HFSB]
Note and Mortgage.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MS.
SEALS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE ITS DECISION
WAS BASED UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THE HFSB NOTE AND
MORTGAGE HAD BEEN SATISFIED IN APRIL 2001.
In its January 31, 2005 Order on Petitioner's Motion
for Judgment and for a Finding of Contempt, the trial court
explained its denial of Ms. Seals' request for an award of
the attorney fees which she was forced to incur in
connection with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings as
follows:
The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling on Seals' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment did not award attorney's fees,
nor did the parties in their subsequent Stipulation and
Settlement provide for the recoupment of attorney's
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an
adversarial proceeding against Condie. Those
proceedings were the appropriate time and place for the
parties to ask for attorney's fees and this Court will
not grant such fees on that basis. Furthermore, the
evidence suggests that the adversarial proceeding was
wholly unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named
creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings... Finally, this
Court notes that the Hopkinsville obligation was
satisfied in April 2001, thus making any subsequent
proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary...
(R. 425-424)

As demonstrated below, the trial court's

conclusions are premised on its misunderstanding of

10

bankruptcy law and its erroneous conclusion that the HFSB
note and mortgage had been satisfied when they were assigned
to Mr. Condie's friend, Brian Steffensen, in April 2001.
A. The Bankruptcy Court did not have authority to award
Ms. Seals' attorney fees.
Bankruptcy courts follow the "American Rule" under
which attorney fees are ordinarily not recoverable unless
authorized by statute or contract.

E.g.,

Dennison

v. Hammond

(In re Hammond), 236 B.R. 751, 769 (Bankr. D.Ut. 1998).
Dennison

case is directly on point.

in Dennison

The

As in the case at bar,

the non-debtor spouse filed a complaint in the

debtor spouse's bankruptcy proceedings seeking a
determination that a debt owed to her by the debtor under
their Utah state court Decree of Divorce was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15).

The non-debtor

spouse also sought an award of the attorney fees which she
paid to prosecute her § 523(a)(15) action.

The bankruptcy

court ruled that the debt was non-dischargeable, but denied
the request for attorney fees, explaining as follows:
For the Debtor to be required to pay [the non-debtor
spouse's] attorney fees for this proceeding, there must
be an underlying basis for the award cognizable in
federal court. "Under the ^American Rule', in cases
brought upon or involving federal law, attorneys' fees
are ordinarily not recoverable absent a specific
statutory authority, a contractual right or aggravated
11

conduct." The [parties'] Decree does not contain a
provision allowing for reasonable expenses incurred in
enforcing the Decree [and] [w]e have found no case law,
contractual or statutory basis for an award of [the
non-debtor spouse's] attorney fees incurred in this [§
523(a) (15)] proceeding, and therefore deny the same.
236 B.R. at 769 (citations omitted).
Even if Ms. Seals' Decree of Divorce specifically
provided for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in
enforcing its terms, such fees would have been recoverable
in bankruptcy court only to the extent that they were
Renfrow

incurred in litigating state law issues.

v.

Draper,

232 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2000)("if a divorce decree
provides for the payment of attorney's fees, and state law
issues are litigated in the bankruptcy proceedings,
attorney's fees are available, but only to the extent that
they are incurred litigating the state law issues"); see

also

Fobian

v.

Western

Farm Credit

F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1991) cert,

Bank

(In re Fobian),

denied

951

505 U.S. 1220,

112 S.Ct. 3031, 120 L.Ed.2d 902 (1992)(attorney fees cannot
be awarded "despite an express contractual provision because
the substantive litigation raised federal bankruptcy law
issues rather than ^basic contract enforcement questions'");

Chance v. White

(In re White),

265 B.R. 547, 560-561

(Bkrtcy. N.D.Tex. 2001)(attorney fees cannot be awarded in
12

connection with § 523(a)(15) litigation despite Texas
statute authorizing divorce court to award fees in divorce
proceedings); and Colbert

v.

Colbert

(In

re

Colbert),

185

B.R. 247, 250 (Bkrtcy. M.D.Tenn. 1995) (§ 523(a) (15) inquiry
is to "determine what portion of the award in state court is
nondischargeable, not to award additional support or create
new, nondischargeable debt").

Accordingly, because the only

issue litigated in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings was
whether his debt to Ms. Seals was dischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (15)1, a federal bankruptcy law issue, Ms.
Seals' attorney fees would not have been recoverable even if
authorized under the Decree of Divorce.
Conversely, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) authorized the
trial court to award Ms. Seals' attorney fees under the
circumstances of the case at bar:
In any action to enforce an order of ... division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense...
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2).
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Condie's
bankruptcy proceedings were the appropriate time and place
for Ms. Seals to have sought an award of attorney fees is
X

(R. 598-603)
13

premised its misunderstanding of the bankruptcy court's
authority to award attorney fees.

Accordingly, unless the

trial court's Order and Judgment is reversed with
instructions for the trial court to properly exercise its
discretion under § 30-3-3(2) in deciding Ms. Seals' request
for attorney fees, Mr. Condie will have successfully avoided
to a great extent his obligations under the hold harmless
provision of the Decree of Divorce.
B. Because Ms. Seals had actual knowledge of Mr.
Condie's bankruptcy proceedings she was forced to file
her § 523(a)(15) action or Mr. Condie's debt to her
would have been discharged under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c)
and 727.
As set forth above, the trial court concluded that Ms.
Seals' "adversarial proceeding was wholly unnecessary
initially, as Seals was not a named creditor in the
bankruptcy proceedings."2

Ms. Seals respectfully submits

that this conclusion is unfounded.
is a matter of law.

See

A bankruptcy discharge

11 U.S.C. § 727.

Because Ms. Seals

had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings,
any debt which Mr. Condie owed to her would have been
discharged whether or not it was listed on Mr. Condie's

2

(R. 424)
14

bankruptcy schedules unless Ms. Seals had timely3 filed her
complaint objecting to dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a) (15).

See,

e.g.,

In re

Price,

871 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.

1989)("The statutory language [of section 523(a)(3)(B)]
clearly contemplates that mere knowledge of a pending
bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to bar the claim of a
creditor who took no action, whether or not that creditor
received official notice from the court of various pertinent
dates"); and Cohen

& Miller,

Consumer

Bankruptcy

Manual

§

4:231 at page 4-450 ("when the creditor has notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time ... for timely requesting a
dischargeability determination, the debtor's omissions
[i.e., failing to list the creditor on the debtor's
schedules] cannot be used by the creditor to except its debt
from discharge").

Section 523(c)(1) specifically provides

that
... the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a
kind specified in paragraph ... (15) of subsection (a)
of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to
whom such debt is owed, and after notice an a hearing,
the court determines such debt to be excepted from

3

Ms. Seals was required to file her adversary proceeding no
later than 60 days after the first date set for Mr. Condie's
meeting of creditors. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007.
15

discharge under paragraph ... (15) ... of subsection
(a) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1) .
That Mr. Condie was well aware of the necessity of Ms.
Seals' § 523(a) (15) action is clearly revealed in his letter
of January 24, 2001, in which he gave Ms. Seals the
following warning:
"... you are hereby given notice of [my bankruptcy
proceedings] and informed that the debt due you will be
discharged the same as if your debt had been duly
listed and scheduled, under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code. In particular, if you believe the
debt owing to Hopkinsville Federal Bank should be
declared nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph 14 of
the Decree of Divorce ... then I would advise you to
file a claim with the abovementioned bankruptcy court.
If you do not file a claim with the bankruptcy court to
determine whether the debt to Hopkinsville Federal
Savings Bank is nondischargeable ... then the debt may
be discharged under section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and a discharge operates as an injunction against
any act to collect a discharged debt."
(R. 551-552)(emphasis added).
In short, the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Seals'
§ 523(a) (15) action was unnecessary because she was not
listed as a creditor in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings
is erroneous.

As Mr. Condie himself recognized, Ms. Seals

was forced to prosecute her adversary proceeding or Mr.
Condie's debt to her would have been discharged under 11
U.S.C. §§ 523(c) & 727.
16

C. The HFSB Note and Mortgage were not satisfied in
April 2001, they were merely assigned to Mr. Condie's
friend.
The trial court's final explanation for denying Ms.
Seals' request for the attorney fees incurred in connection
with Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceedings is that "the
Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied in April 2001, thus
making any subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy wholly
unnecessary.. /'

(R. 424)

Ms. Seals respectfully submits

that this explanation is a conclusion of law which is
unfounded.

However, to the extent that it can be

characterized as a finding of fact, Ms. Seals will marshal
the evidence.
The only evidence which would support a finding that
the Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank obligation was
satisfied in April 2001 is Mr. Condie's testimony and only
if that testimony is taken out of context.
Q. All right. Now, you ultimately got the note taken
care of; correct? You got the loan satisfied with
Hopkinsville and the debt satisfied?
A. Correct... The note and the mortgage to Hopkinsville
Federal was assigned to a Utah LLC managed by Brian
Steffensen, who I worked for at the time.
Q. Okay. Did you notify [Ms. Seals] that the
note had been satisfied?
A. Yes, I had.
17

the

Q. Okay. Did Hopkinsville Federal, did they continue
to pursue their [collection] action against [Ms. Seals]
once the note had been satisfied?
A. No.

It was dismissed.

THE COURT: When was the dismissal?
THE WITNESS: The dismissal was April...
THE COURT: Of what year?
THE WITNESS: Of 2001.
(R. 550 at page 86, line 5 through page 87, line 2)
Based upon this testimony alone it would have been
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the HFSB
note and mortgage had been satisfied in April 2001 and,
therefore, that Ms. Seals' subsequent adversary proceeding
was unnecessary.

However, it is very clear not only from

Mr. Condie's own testimony, but also from the other evidence
presented at the hearing, that the HFSB obligation was not
satisfied until April of 2004.
Mr. Condies' friend, Brian Steffensen, purchased and
took an assignment of the HFSB note and mortgage on or about
March 30, 2001.

(R. 648)

Thereafter, Mr. Condie began

making payments on the note to Mr. Steffensen.
page 128, lines 18-25).

(R. 550 at

However, it was not until April

2004 that Mr. Condie finished paying the note and Mr.

18

Steffensen executed a Release of [the HFSB] Note and
Mortgage.

(R. 647)

Q. ...did Brian Steffensen ever pursue a collection
action
A. No.

Q. ...Did you ultimately satisfy that
A. Yes.
Q.

obligation?
When did you satisfy that obligation?

A. It was released in April of this year, April of
2004.
(R. 550 at page 113, line 24 through page 114, line 10).
At the conclusion of the December 2004 hearing the
trial court understood that the HFSB obligation was not
satisfied until April 2004 and Mr. Condie's counsel did not
suggest otherwise:
THE COURT: ... Efforts were undertaken to take care of
the Hopkinsville debt, but that
but when we say
we've satisfied it, satisfaction typically means that
the obligation's been released and security that's been
pledged has now been returned. That wasn't the case
here. It was simply assigned to somebody else.
Mr. Jennings: Right. Someone who was never actively
pursuing litigation against the
against it.
(R. 550 at page 178, lines 16-23)
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It may be that by the time the trial court issued its
January 1, 2005 Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment
and for a Finding of Contempt4 (nearly two months after the
December 2004 hearing) the trial court simply failed to
recollect the time period in which the HFSB obligation was
satisfied.

In any event, it is very clear that the trial

court's conclusion/finding that the HFSB obligation was
satisfied in April 2001 when it was assigned to Mr.
Steffensen is erroneous.

It was not satisfied until April

of 2004 when Mr. Condie completed his payments to Mr.
Steffensen and Mr. Steffensen executed a Release of Note and
Mortgage.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Ms. Seals' request for the attorney
fees which she incurred in prosecuting her § 523(a) (15)
action in Mr. Condie's bankruptcy proceeding.

Contrary to

the trial court's conclusion, Mr. Condie's bankruptcy
proceedings were not the time and place for Ms. Seals to
have sought attorney fees because the bankruptcy court did
not have authority to award Ms. Seals' attorney fees.

4

(R. 426)
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Also

contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Ms. Seals was
forced to file her adversary proceedings despite the fact
that Mr. Condie initially failed to list her as a creditor
because she had actual knowledge of Mr. Condie's bankruptcy
proceedings.

Finally, the trial court's conclusion/finding

that Ms. Seals' § 523(a)(15) action was unnecessary because
the HFSB obligation had been satisfied in^April 2001 is
clearly erroneous.

While Mr. Condie's friend purchased and

took an assignment of the note and mortgage in April 2001,
they were not satisfied until April 2004 when Mr. Condie
finished paying the note and his friend executed a Release
of Note and Mortgage.
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Seals respectfully requests
that the trial court's Order and Judgment be reversed to the
extent that it denied Ms. Seals' request for a judgment for
the attorney fees incurred in connection with Mr. Condie's
bankruptcy proceedings and that this matter be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings.

Ms. Seals also

requests an award of attorney fees incurred in prosecuting
this appeal in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2)-.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

Parenting plan — Definitions
Pare atiagp2aa — Fding—
Modifications
Parenting plan — Objectives — Required provisions — Dispute resolution
30-3-10 17
Social security number m court lecords
30-3-11
Repealed
30-3-11 i
Family Court Act — Purpose
30-3-11 2
Appointment of counsel for child
30-3-11 3
Mandatory educational course for divorcing
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions
30-3-12
Courts to exercise family counseling powers
30-3-13
Repealed
30-3-13 i
Establishment of family court division of district court
30-3-14
Repealed
30-3-14 i
Designation of judges — Terms
30-3-15
Repealed
30-3-15 i
Appointment of domestic relations counselors,
family court commissioner, and assistants
and clerks
30-3-15 2
Repealed
30-3-15 3
Commissioners — Powers
30-3-15 4
Salaries and expenses
30-3-16
Repealed
30-3-16 i
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers
30-3-16 2
Petition for conciliation
30-3-16 3
Contents of petition
30-3-16 4
Procedure upon filing of petition
30-3-16 5
Fees
30-3-16 e
Information not available to public
30-3-16 7
Effect of petition — Pendency of action
30-3-17
Power and jurisdiction of judge
30-3-17 i
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written
evaluation by counselor
30-3-18
Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and
education services not to be construed as
condonation or promotion
30-3 19 to 30-•-3-31 Repealed
30-3-32
Parent-time — Intent — Policy — Definitions
30-3-33
Advisory guidelines
30-3-34
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption
30 3-35
Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age
30 3-35 5
Minimum schedule for parent-time for children undei five years of age
30-3-36
Special circumstances
30-3-37
Relocation
30 3-38
Pilot Program for Expedited Parent-time Enforcement
3&~3-£. Procedure
— Residence
— Grounds.
(1) P r o c e e c i m g S m divorce are commenced and conducted as
provide^ by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as
piovided m this chapter
(2) Tl\ e court may decree a dissolution of the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the
grounds specified m Subsection (3) in all cases where the
petitioner o r respondent has been an actual and bona fide
resident 0 f this state and of the county where the action is
brought, o r if members of the armed forces of the United
States \>ho are not legal residents of this state, where the
petitions! has been stationed in this state under military
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of
the actiQ n
(3) G r o u n o ! s for divoice

30-3-3

(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar
ge,
(h) adultery committed by the respondent
subsequent
to
*narnage,
te) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent
f° r more than one year,
(<}) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the
petitioner the common necessaries of life,
($) habitual drunkenness of the respondent,
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony,
(§) cruel t r e a t m e n t of the petitioner by the respondent
to
the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental
distress to the petitioner,
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage,
d) incurable insanity, or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately
un
^ e r a decree of separate maintenance of any state for
tnr
s e consecutive years without cohabitation
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does
not affe c t the liability of either party under any provision for
separate maintenance previously granted
(5) (§) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of
ins
a m t y unless
(I) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the
appropriate authorities of this or another state pi lor
to the commencement of the action, and
(II) the court finds by the testimony of competent
witnesses t h a t the insanity of the respondent is
incurable
ft) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian
ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon
dent A copy of the summons and complaint shall be
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as
P ro Vided by the laws of this state m other actions for
d i v ^ r c e ) o r upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the
cou
h t y attorney for t h e county where the action is prosecuted
(<i) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of
the c a s e a n c [ 2f the respondent resides out of tins state,
tak^ depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and
ma
k e a defense as is just to protect the rights of the
res
fc»ondent and the interests of the state
^ ) In all actions t h e court and judge have jurisdiction
ove
r the payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
anc
l the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce
(^) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
res
*des m this state, upon notice, have the respondent
broUght mto the court at trial, or have an examination of
t h e respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine the mental condition of the respondent For
thi$ purpose either party may have leave from the court to
ent^r any asylum or institution where the respondent
ma
> be confined The costs of court m this action shall be
a
PPortioned by the court
1997
na

30-3-2. Right of h u s b a n d to divorce.
The h u s b a n d may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife
for the s , a m e causes and in the same manner as the wife may
obtain a divorce from hei husband
1953
30-3-3.

Award of costs, a t t o r n e y and w i t n e s s fees —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In a n y action filed undei Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and
m any action to establish an older of custody, parent-time,
child supp 0 r t } alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, thg court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney
fees, a n a witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the
other pqrty to enable the othei party to prosecute or defend

30-3-4
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the action The order may include provision for costs of t h e
action
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining t h a t the party substantially prevailed upon t h e
claim or defense The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the p a i t y
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees
(3) In any action listed m Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children m t h e custody of t h e other party
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or m t h e final order or judgment
2001
30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — D e c r e e — U s e of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in t h e
cause If t h e decree is to be entered upon t h e default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended t h e mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11 3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to t h e court The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or m the
best interest of the parties
(&) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon t h e petitioner's
affidavit
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance m the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings h a s applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree
1997
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

D i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e a n d
h e a l t h c a r e of p a r t i e s a n d c h i l d r e n — Divis i o n of d e b t s — Court to h a v e c o n t i n u i n g
jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
D e t e r m i n a t i o n of a l i m o n y — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s
p e t i t i o n for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include m it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessaiy medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children,

8

(b) if coverage is or becomes available a t a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children,
(c) p u r s u a n t to Section 15-4-6 5
(I) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage,
(II) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses, and
(III) provisions for the enforcement of these orders,
and
(d) provisions for income withholding m accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent If t h e court determines t h a t the
circumstances are appropriate and t h a t the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters
related to children born to the mother and father after entry of
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent time or visitation
schedule entered u n d e r this chapter
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody 01 parenttime provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if the court
determines t h a t the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78 32-12 2 where a visitation or parent-time
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney
fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent time
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors m determining alimony
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse,
(II) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income,
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support,
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SECTION 523

§

523

(11 U.S.C. § 523)

Exceptions to discharge. 1

§523.

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt—
(1)

for a tax or a customs duty—

(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section
507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for
such tax was filed or allowed;
(B)
(i)

with respect to which a return, if required—
was not filed; or

(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was
last due, under applicable law or under any extension,
and after two years before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent
return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or
defeat such tax;
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal,
or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by—
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition;
(B)
(i)

use of a statement in writing—
that is materially false;

(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
1

[Editors' Note: The following is a related provision of section 304 ("Protection of Child
Support and Alimony") of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394
(enacted on October 22, 1994):
(g) Appearance Before Court.—Child support creditors or their representatives
shall be permitted to appear and intervene without charge, and without meeting any
special local court rule requirement for attorney appearances, in any bankruptcy case
or proceeding in any bankruptcy court or district court of the United States if such
creditors or representatives file a form in such court that contains information
detailing the child support debt, its status, and other characteristics.]
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(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable
for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably
relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published
with intent to deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating
more than $1,225 2 for "luxury goods or services" incurred
by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the
order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating
more than $1,225 3 that are extensions of consumer credit
under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual
debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief under
this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable: "luxury
goods or services" do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer
credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined for
purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act;
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this
title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to
whom such debt is owed, in time to permit—
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph
(2), (4), or (6) 4 of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge
of the case in time for such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2),
(4), or (6) 5 of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim
and timely request for a determination of dischargeability
of such debt u n d e r one of such paragraphs, unless such
2

[Editors' Note: For cases commenced prior to April 1, 2004, the dollar amount is
$1,150.]
3
[Editors' Note: See note 2 supra.]
4
[Editors' Note: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 (effective
on October 22, 1994), added paragraph (15) to section 523(a) and amended section
523(c)(1) to include cross-references to that paragraph. In conjunction with these
amendments, Congress should have amended section 523(a)(3)(A) and (B) to include
cross-references to paragraph (15); this omission appears inadvertent.]
5

[Editors' Note: See note 4 supra.]
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creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time I
for such timely filing and request;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or
child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record, determination made
in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental
unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent
that—

I

I
J
I

(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily,
by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned
pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or
any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such
State); or

I
J
I

(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity or to the property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and
is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax
penalty—
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph
(1) of this subsection; or

J
I

I

(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that
occurred before three years before the date of the filing of
the petition;
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds
received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend,
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents;
I

§ 523
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(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug,
or another substance;
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by
the debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title
or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived
discharge, or was denied a discharge under section 727(a)(2),
(3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or under section 14c(l), (2),
(3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act;
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order,
or consent order or decree entered in any court of the United
States or of any State, issued by a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of fraud
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed
with respect to any depository institution or insured credit
union;
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository
institution, except that this paragraph shall not extend any
such commitment which would otherwise be terminated due
to any act of such agency;
(13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued
under title 18, United States Code;
(14) incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would
be nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1);
(15) 6 not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation
or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
or other order of a court of record, a determination made in
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit
unless—
6
[Editors' Note Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-394
(effective on October 22,1994), amended section 523(a) by adding a new paragraph (15).
Although Congress intended to add this new paragraph at the end of subsection (a),
the language of section 304 ot the 1994 Act states that it is to be added at the end of
"section 523 " The editors have placed paragraph (15) m its intended location in
subsection (a), rather than at the end of section 523 ]
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(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt I
from income or property of the debtor not reasonably
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor
is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation
of such business; or

I

(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to
the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor;

I
I

(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable
after the order for relief to a membership association with
respect to the debtor's interest in a dwelling unit that has
condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative housing corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable
for a period during which—
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in
the condominium or cooperative project; or

I

(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and
received payments from the tenant for such period,
but nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the
debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for a period arising before entry of the order for relief
in a pending or subsequent bankruptcy case;
(17) for a fee imposed by a court for the filing of a case,
motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses
assessed with respect to such filing, regardless of an assertion
of poverty by the debtor under section 1915(b) or (f) of title
28, or the debtor's status as a prisoner, as defined in section
1915(h) of title 28;
(18)
is—
(A)

owed under State law to a State or municipality that
in the nature of support, and

I

(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.); or
(19)
(A)
|
I

that—
is for—

(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws
(as that term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities I

§ 523
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Exchange Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws,
or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or
State securities laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security; and
(B)

results from—

(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree
entered in any Federal or State judicial or administrative
proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the
debtor; or
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment
owed by the debtor.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt that
was excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), or
(a)(8) of this section, under section 17a(l), 17a(3), or 17a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, under section 439A of the Higher Education Act
of 1965, or under section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act
in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title, or under
the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a case under this title
unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, such debt
is not dischargeable in the case under this title.
(c)
(1) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this
section, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind
specified in paragraph (2), (4), (6), or (15) of subsection (a) of this
section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such
debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), (6),
or (15) as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a Federal
depository institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its capacity as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured
depository institution, to recover a debt described in subsection (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or (a)(ll) owed to such institution by
an institution-affiliated party unless the receiver, conservator,
or liquidating agent was appointed in time to reasonably
comply, or for a Federal depository institutions regulatory
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agency acting in its corporate capacity as a successor to such I
receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably comply, with subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such institutionaffiliated party with respect to such debt
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability
of a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and
such debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in favor
of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for,
the proceeding if the court fmds that the position of the creditor
was not substantially justified, except that the court shall not
award such costs and fees if special circumstances would make
the award unjust
(e) Any institution-affiliated party of a [sic] insured depository institution shall be considered to be acting in a fiduciary
capacity with respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4) or (11)

Legislative History to Section 523
This section specifies which of the debtor's debts are not discharged in a
bankruptcy case, and certain procedures for effectuating the section The
provision m Bankruptcy Act section 17c granting the bankruptcy courts
jurisdiction to determme dischargeability is deleted as unnecessary, m view
of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed m proposed 28 U S C
§ 1471(b), which is adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy
courts have today over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy
Act section 17c The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will specify, as they do
today, who may request determmations of dischargeability, subject, of course,
to pioposed 11 U S C § 523(c), and when such a request may be made
Proposed 11 U S C § 350, providing for reopening of cases, provides one
possible procedure for a determination of dischargeability and related issues
after a case is closed
Subsection (a) lists eight [ten as amended by Pub L No 98-353] debts
excepted from discharge Taxes that are entitled to priority are excepted from
discharge under paragraph (1) In addition, taxes with respect to which the
debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat,
or with respect to which a return (if required) was not filed or was not filed
after the due date and after one year before the bankruptcy case are excepted
from discharge If the taxing authority's claim has been disallowed, then it
would be barred by the more modern rules of collateral estoppel from
reassertmg that claim agamst the debtor after the case was closed See Plumb,
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§ 727.
(a)

(11 U . S . C § 727)

Discharge.
The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—

(1)

the debtor is not an individual;

(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of
property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed,
mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred,
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed—
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of
the petition;
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, from which
the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might
be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified
under all of the circumstances of the case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—
(A)

made a false oath or account;

(B)

presented or used a false claim;

(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain
money, property, or advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or forbearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to
possession under this title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to
the debtor's property or financial affairs;
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before
determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any
loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's
liabilities;
(6)

the debtor has refused, in the case—
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(A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an
order to respond to a material question or to testify;
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination,
to respond to a material question approved by the court or
to testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity with
respect to the matter concerning which such privilege was
invoked; or
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a material
question approved by the court or to testify;
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection, on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, or during
the case, in connection with another case, under this title or
under the Bankruptcy Act, concerning an insider;
(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this
section, under section 1141 of this title, or under sections 14,
371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within
six years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under sections
1228 or 1328 of this title, or under sections 660 or 661 of the
Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six years before
the date of the filing of the petition, unless payments under
the plan in such case totaled at least—
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such
case; or
(B)

(i) 70 percent of such claims; and

(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith,
and was the debtor's best effort; or
(10) the court approves a written waiver of discharge
executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this
chapter.
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge
under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from
all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under
this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined under
section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based
on any such debt or liability is filed under section 501 of this title,

§ 727
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and whether or not a claim based on any such debt or liability
is allowed under section 502 of this title.
(c)
(1) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee
may object to the granting of a discharge under subsection (a)
of this section.
(2) On request of a party in interest, the court may order
the trustee to examine the acts and conduct of the debtor to
determine whether a ground exists for denial of discharge.
(d) On request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall revoke a
discharge granted under subsection (a) of this section if—
(1) such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the
debtor, and the requesting party did not know of such fraud
until after the granting of such discharge;
(2) the debtor acquired property that is property of the
estate, or became entitled to acquire property that would be
property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently failed
to report the acquisition of or entitlement to such property, or
to deliver or surrender such property to the trustee; or
(3) the debtor committed an act specified in subsection
(a)(6) of this section.
(e) The trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee may
request a revocation of a discharge—
(1) under subsection (d)(1) of this section within one year
after such discharge is granted; or
(2) under subsection (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section before
the later of—
(A)

one year after the granting of such discharge; and

(B)

the date the case is closed.

Legislative History to Section 727
This section is the heart of the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law.
Subsection (a) requires the court to grant a debtor a discharge unless one of
eight conditions is met. [Editors' Note: The Senate Report lists "nine" conditions.] The first condition is that the debtor is not an individual. This is a
change from present law, under which corporations and partnerships may
be discharged in liquidation cases, though they rarely are. The change in policy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SARAH S. CONDIE, nka
SARAH S. SEALS,

:
:

ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR A
FINDING OF CONTEMPT

:

CASE NO.

Petitioner,
9943 00200 DA

vs.
DAVID C. CONDIE,
Respondent.

This matter having come before the Court on petitioner Sarah
Seals' ("Seals") Motion for Judgment of Support and for a Finding
of Contempt on December 8 and 9, 2004, Brent R. Chipman appearing
for and on behalf of Seals, and Jarrod H. Jennings appearing for
and on behalf of respondent David C. Condie ("Condie"), the Court
having heard testimony and argument, and received evidence on the
issues, hereby finds and orders as follows:
1.
issues

Judgement,
of

arrearages

The Court has previously entered Judgment on
on

child

support,

attorney's fees on November 3, 2 004.

health

insurance

and

Issues on attorney's fees for

real property and bankruptcy issues and a request for contempt were
reserved for this proceeding.

CONDIE V. CONDIE
2.

ORDER

PAGE 2

Contempt.

The Court finds that there is no basis for a

finding of contempt, as the evidence concerning Condie's financial
condition during the periods in question and the payments on child
support he did make suggest that Condie was not intentionally or
deliberately avoiding or neglecting his obligation to his children.
Accordingly, this Court denies Seals' request for a finding of
contempt.
3.

Attorney's fees.
(a)

Kentucky

f ees:

This

Court

finds

that

the

fees

incurred by Seals for the services of her Kentucky lawyer, Michael
Richardson, in defending against a claim by Hopkinsville Federal
Savings Bank for which Condie had agreed to hold Seals harmless are
reasonable

and

necessary

against Condie.

and

should be awarded

as a Judgment

Accordingly, the Court awards Judgment against

Condie in the amount of $870, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
(b)
on

Bankruptcy fees : The Bankruptcy Court in its ruling

Seals'

Motion

for

attorney's

fees,

nor

Partial
did

Summary Judgment

the

parties

in

did

their

not

award

subsequent

Stipulation and Settlement provide for recoupment of attorney's
fees for the services of Steven Rupp in pursuing an adversarial
proceeding against Condie.

Those proceedings were the appropriate

CONDIE V. CONDIE
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time and place for the parties to ask for attorney's fees and this
Court will not grant such fees on that basis.
evidence

suggests

that

the

adversarial

Furthermore, the

proceeding

was

wholly

unnecessary initially, as Seals was not a named creditor in the
bankruptcy proceedings.
to whether

Seals

Thereafter, the evidence is contested as

requested

to be named a creditor under

the

bankruptcy proceedings or not, and thus Seals has not met her
"burden of proof on that issue.

Finally, this Court notes that the

Hopkinsville obligation was satisfied in April 2 001, thus making
any subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy wholly unnecessary as is
underscored by the Bankruptcy Court's own musings after listening
to the parties' argument

in Seals' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment that " . . .under the circumstances I can't see that there is
any dispute."
pp. 19-20.)

(Transcript of Partial Summary Judgment Proceedings,
Accordingly, this Court denies Judgment for any fees

incurred by Seals in the bankruptcy proceedings.
(c)
in attorney's

Chipman Release of Lien Fees. Seals incurred $1,070
fees

through

her

lawyer, Brent

R.

Chipman,

in

obtaining a release of mortgage on Tooele property for which Condie
had a duty to hold harmless.

The Court finds those fees to be

reasonable and necessary, and hereby awards Judgment against Condie

CONDIE V. CONDIE
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in the amount of $1,070, plus prejudgment interest since September
20, 2 004, and post-judgment interest after Judgment.
(d)

Chipman Fees for Hearings.

This Court finds that

some additional award of attorney's fees is necessary in the issues
for which Seals was successful at the hearings in September and
December 2004.

This Court awarded Seals $900 as contribution

toward her attorney's fees in pursuing child support and insurance
arrearage in September, and has awarded her additional fees as set
forth above.

The Court finds that Mr. Chipman's billing rate is

reasonable based upon his years of experience and the billing rates
of comparable attorneys with similar practices and experience in
the community.

This Court

further finds that

Seals was only

partially successful on the issues brought before this Court, and
that she was unsuccessful on issues in the evidentiary hearing in
December which incurred the largest portion of the attorney's fees
incurred by her.
filed

herein,

additional

Having reviewed the Affidavit of Brent Chipman

this

award

of

Court

finds

attorney's

that Seals
fees of

is

entitled

$2,100,

and

to

an

costs

of

$245.71, and an additional award of $440 in attorney's fees for the
preparation of this Order as an award and Judgment against Condie.
Mr.

Chipman

is to prepare

the Order consistent with this

CONDIE V. CONDIE
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ruling.
Dated this

31 day of January, 2005.

RANDALL N. SKANCHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ORDER
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Petitioner's Motion for Judgment and for a
Finding of Contempt, to the following, this
2005:

Brent R. Chipman
Attorney for Petitioner
215 S. State Street, 12 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jarrod H. Jennings
Attorney for Respondent
808 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

/

day of -January, /
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SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111)
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)942-7048
Facsimile: (801)942-7047
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

SARAH S. CONDIE nka
SARAH S. SEALS,

*

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
*

vs.
DAVID C. CONDIE,

*

Civil No. 994300200DA

*

Respondent.

*
*

*

Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
*

*

In accordance with the January 31, 2005 ORDER ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT
and the March 14, 2005 RULING AND ORDER, and finding good cause
therefor,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Petitioner and
against Respondent for attorney fees incurred in defending
against the claim of Hopkinsville Federal Savings Bank in the
amount of $870.00, together with pre-judgment interest thereon at
the rate of 10% per annum from January 16, 2 001 to the date of
this Order and Judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of
4.77% per annum from the date of this Order and Judgment until
paid.

2. Petitioner's request for a judgment for attorney fees
incurred in connection with Respondent's bankruptcy proceedings
is denied.
3. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Petitioner and
against Respondent for attorney fees incurred in obtaining a
release of the mortgage on the Tooele property for which
Respondent had a hold harmless duty in the amount of $1,070.00,
together with pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum
from September 20, 2004 to the date of this Order and Judgment
and post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.77% per annum from
the date of this Order and Judgment until paid.
4.

Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner for her costs in

the amount of $245.71 and attorney fees in the amount of
$2,540.00 incurred in connection with the September and December
2004 hearings before this Court and in preparing this Order and
Judgment.
5.

Petitioner's request for a finding of contempt is

denied.
DATED this

JH

day of April 2005.

Honorable ^RaAda11 Skanchy
District Court Judge

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
U n d e r s i g n e d c e r t i f i e s t h a t a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g was
s e r v e d t h i s ^ / / z ^ d a y of A p r i l 2005 v i a f i r s t c l a s s U . S . M a i l ,
p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , a d d r e s s e d a s f o l l o w s : J a r r o d H. J e n n i n g s , 808 E.
S o u t h T e m p l e , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102.
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